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1. Subject of the Thesis  
We are witnessing a technological revolution fuelled by rapid scientific innovation in fields 
such as artificial intelligence research, genetic engineering, computational science, 
nanotechnology, neuroscience, and biotechnology. The peculiarity of the current technological 
revolution lies in its exponential character, best expounded upon by Moore’s Law, which was 
originally applied solely to the transistor density on semiconductor chips. Ray Kurzweil, the 
controversial evangelist of this technological revolution, argued that a similar exponential pace of 
change in speed and cost-effectiveness is present in other areas of the techno-scientific ecosystem 
(Kurzweil, 2000). Further uniqueness of the current scientific revolution can be identified in its 
interconnectedness and interdisciplinary character. Boundaries of scientific and academic 
disciplines are blurred as different fields shape one another to an unprecedented extent, boosting 
progress even further. The speed of change intensifies the dynamic interaction between science, 
technology, society, and the arts. Any discussion of a specific scientific achievement always and 
inevitably leads to the contemplation of its impact on society and the policy implications it entails. 
These changes terrify many individuals, who envision dystopian outcomes, while making others 
overly optimistic about the future. Those calling themselves transhumanists tend to belong to the 
latter group. 
Transhumanism holds that humanity will transcend its biological limits of existence through 
technology and science, which will consequently have far-reaching implications for the political 
realm. This turbulence in science and technology has penetrated public and academic discourse 
and calls for new practices in policy-making and novel approaches in political science. As a starting 
point, this dissertation intends to put forward the first ideological analysis of transhumanism.  
The purpose of this dissertation was to better understand transhumanism as an ideology, to 
identify its main ideational components, reveal its conceptual architecture, and position it in the 
ideological space. The main research question and hypothesis can be conveyed as follows: 
R: Is transhumanism an ideology? 
H: Transhumanism is a thin-centred ideology. 
To answer the main research question and test the validity of the hypothesis, this dissertation 
conducted an ideological analysis based on Michael Freeden’s morphological approach applied 
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through a content analysis of key transhumanist texts. As part of the analysis, the following 
secondary research questions were answered: 
• R1) Does transhumanism exhibit conceptual coherency? 
• R2) What are the core ideas, key values, and claims (decontestation chains1) that make up 
transhumanism? 
• R3) How can the conceptual structure of transhumanism be described? 
• R4) What is the extent to which these concepts and claims are distinct from other ideologies? 
 
The first part of dissertation discussed why the morphological approach is the ideal method of 
analysis in the case of transhumanism. Chapter 2 focused on the social and cultural context. It 
summarised briefly the intellectual history of transhumanism, then, it presented the milestones of 
the history of the transhumanist movement: the formation of various organisations and its 
development into a global phenomenon with a multinational membership. Next, the quest to accept 
transhumanism in academic circles as an eligible subject for scientific scrutiny was explained. To 
comprehensively reveal the process of institutionalisation, the final section in this chapter covered 
the emergence of political representation among transhumanists. In Chapter 3 and 4, the 
dissertation engaged in the ideological analysis. It examined the major decontestations within the 
transhumanist conceptual architecture to reveal the core, adjacent, and peripheral concepts of 
transhumanist ideology. This part unveiled how transhumanism acquired unique issue ownership 
over a variety of social issues and addressed its attempt to create a novel semantic field to frame 
and interpret the perceived consequences of techno-scientific progress, revealing an intellectual 
project far more substantive, complex, and encompassing than its frequent reduction to a mere 
dystopia. Chapter 5 presented a conceptual map of transhumanism to visualise the key findings of 
the conceptual analysis and provide new insights into the study of transhumanism. The inferences 
from the preceding chapters allowed to test the main hypothesis and to foreground a new account 
of the transhumanist thought system in Chapter 6 where a three-part argument was presented to 
justify the categorisation of transhumanism as a thin-centred ideology. 
 
 
1 The term ‘decontestation chain’ was coined by Manfred B. Steger to describe the decontestation process as a chain 
of concepts and ideological claims (Steger, 2008). 
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1.1. The Relevance of Transhumanism for Political Science 
 
For political scientists, the relevance of studying transhumanism may lie in the fact that key 
transhumanist issues are already discussed at different levels of policymaking. There are now 
numerous white papers, committee hearings, advisory papers, and draft legislation on 
transhumanist topics and their number is rapidly growing. Furthermore, during the most recent five 
years, transhumanist political parties have emerged all over the world. Although these parties are 
at an embryonic stage and have yet to affect party competition, there is great potential for 
transhumanist topics to influence the party system because rapid techno-scientific advances raise 
the same issues transhumanists otherwise advocate (Szabados, 2019). Thus, these topics will 
inevitably be addressed with increasing intensity by political parties and other political actors with 
or without the presence of political representatives of a pro-science and pro-tech intellectual 
movement. Finally, transhumanist thinkers have devised novel theoretical suggestions that may 
shape many political science subfields. 
The study of transhumanism as an ideology has various benefits. First, it can provide far-sighted 
explanations of the effects of techno-scientific achievements on political theory and practice in 
general, as well as illuminating the growing popularity of the pro-science transhumanist movement 
among specific social groups. By uncovering ideological morphologies, it is possible to depict how 
certain transhumanist ideas interlink to form a unique, multi-layered, utopian vision of society that 
currently no other ideologies represent. Second, it helps follow and gauge the historical 
development of transhumanist thought, therefore, both diachronic and synchronic analyses are 
possible. Furthermore, only by showing its interactions with other, competing ideologies can one 
understand the articulation of transhumanist political offerings and the policy initiatives put 
forward by transhumanist political parties in recent years. Finally, bringing ideology into the 
analysis of transhumanism allows us to look at current trends in political theorising from a valuable 





Michael Freeden’s morphological analysis is considered one of the most influential methods of 
ideological analysis. His approach focuses on the ideational content and the conceptual structure 
of belief systems and is less concerned with the manifestation of those concepts in institutional or 
psychological layers. Morphological analysis also reveals the macro- and micro-structures of 
concepts, their relative positions to each other, and the interdependence and interactions among 
various concepts and conceptions. The results of such investigations are always comprehensive 
frameworks through which groups of people understand their political and socio-economic world, 
express their identity, and allocate meaning and significance to certain concepts.  
The morphological approach holds that the core elements of an ideology are concepts, for 
example liberty, equality, order, authority, and welfare (Freeden, 2004, 2005a, 2005b, 2006). To 
constrain the extreme flexibility of concepts, and in its quest for semantic hegemony, ideology 
confers a specific meaning to a political concept. Freeden has termed this the process of 
decontestation, the determination of meaning based on a specific morphological arrangement 
(Freeden, 2013, p. 120). Decontestation is the way an ideology allocates a particular meaning or 
adds a stipulative definition to a concept distinguishing it from how other ideologies conceptualize 
the same concepts. 
The morphological analysis differentiates core, adjacent, and peripheral concepts when 
examining the macro-structure of an ideology (Freeden, 1996, p. 77). Core concepts are 
characterised by their long-term durability, ubiquitousness, and indispensability. They are present 
in all versions and mutations of the ideology and determine the ideational content of the belief 
system. Adjacent and peripheral concepts refer to the mutations of core concepts. They appear less 
frequently than core concepts and refine the meaning of the ideological core. Combinations of 
adjacent and core concepts create different versions of an ideology. Adjacency can be determined 
by logical inferences as well as cultural variables. Peripheral concepts play a marginal role, rapidly 
change both culturally and diachronically, and are capable of moving to the ideological centre to 
become adjacent concepts or – in rare cases – core concepts. They react to externalities and, 
therefore, are sometimes connected to social practices, cultural variances, or historical events. 
The morphological approach has multiple advantages, among which the most important is its 
lack of negative preconception against the subject of its scrutiny: it disapproves of the 
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pathologisation of ideologies that characterizes many other analytical methods. Second, the 
morphological approach seems suitable for detecting immature or proto-ideologies that do not yet 
participate in the ideational competition as a salient player. Third, the morphological approach does 
not separate ideologies from each other with theoretical barbwire. Conversely, the borders between 
various ideologies are permeable and allow for the exchange of ideas, conceptualisations, or 
definitions without weakening a belief system’s solidity or undermining its internal coherence. 
Fourth, it moves beyond the left–right axis of conceptualisation, deploying instead a multi-
dimensional research toolkit for the ideational study. Finally, conceptual mapping is a highly 
accessible mode of ideological analysis: such a visualisation provides a clear representation of 
ideological composition, which at the same time reveals the differences between ideologies and 
their mutations and can trace spatial and temporal changes to describe the position, ranking, and 
prevalence of components. The morphological approach enables researchers to pinpoint an 
ideological position at a given point in time and conduct a synchronic comparison with contested 
ideologies within the socio-economic context of that era, whereby the historical evolution of the 
given ideological position can also be revealed. 
This dissertation investigated whether transhumanism could be described as having ideological 
coherency, what core ideas, key values, and claims (decontestation chains) make up its ideational 
architect, how, if at all, the conceptual structure of transhumanism could best be described, to what 
extent these transhumanist concepts and claims are distinct from those of other ideologies. 
 
3. Results 
First, this dissertation presented its argument that transhumanism was an adequate subject of 
ideological analysis since it could be described with the main ideological attributes of 
transhumanism within the Freedenian framework. It was proven that for four out of six attributes 
– relevance, influence, efficiency, consumability – transhumanism meets Freeden’s criteria of the 
eligibility for ideational analysis, while its level of institutionalisation is immature. Then, the 
investigation continued with exploring the conceptual coherence of transhumanism, the most 




3.1. Core concepts 
 
Four interconnected and interdependent core concepts were identified - liberty (freedom), 
progress, human welfare, and individuality - that emerged in the form of five unique 
decontestations: human enhancement, morphological freedom, longevity, the proactionary 
principle, and personhood. They point to the existence of a sound and unique ideological structure, 
a conceptual distinctiveness that corresponds to Freeden’s set of criteria for determining an 
ideational cluster’s degree of ideological maturity. 
Transhumanism decontests liberty as morphological freedom, a concept positioned in the 
gravitational centre of the transhumanist ideological universe. According to Anders Sandberg’s 
broad definition, morphological freedom is ‘the right to modify oneself according to one’s desires’ 
(Sandberg, 2013). This modification must aim to enhance the subject’s physical, cognitive, and 
emotional capabilities through utilising the advances of technology and science. Similar to other 
basic rights, morphological freedom ought to prescribe that the subject is aware to a substantial 
level of the risks of the decision to their personal well-being, and the impact it will have on others 
within society; it should also stipulate that the subject must bear legal responsibility for their 
actions. Only well-informed agents can make decisions based on proper rational and moral 
judgements. Hence the prerequisites to morphological freedom are rationally consumed 
information and consensus. Nick Bostrom refers to this as the ‘informed wish’ of the subject who 
decides to avail themselves of any enhancement technology, making it a logically adjacent concept 
to morphological freedom (Bostrom, 2003). 
An additional argument for the salience of morphological freedom within the ideological 
analytical context stems from the fact that its emergence is a purely cultural phenomenon. Its birth 
and elevation to the height of a conceptual arrangement is due to the disruptive techno-scientific 
advances that characterise our times. Genetically enhanced humans, cross-species, human-machine 
hybrid life forms, machines with human-level – or even surpassing human-level – cognitive 
capabilities have been unfathomable for those thinkers who laid down the theoretical foundations 
of the concept of liberty in previous centuries. However, science provides new evidence on a daily 
basis that the traditional conceptualisation of the notion human needs fundamental reconsideration 




Morphological freedom fundamentally transforms the debate over whom we ought to be 
because it expands not only our capabilities, but also our moral horizon given the possibility of the 
beyond-human perspective created by science and technology. However, it does not prescribe what 
we exactly ‘ought to be’, as in what bodily modifications we are compelled to implement. Instead, 
it allows for and promotes pluralism in the life of the individual, with the limitation of not doing 
harm to others. This explains why contemporary transhumanists delve so deeply into the issue of 
moral enhancement (Persson and Savulescu, 2010). It also explains why most of the criticism 
against transhumanism is morally grounded and targets the concept of morphological freedom. 
Morphological freedom logically entails and promotes the removal of cultural constraints from the 
creation of radically novel and diverse forms of existence. These advances first raise a logically 
deductible set of ethical issues, followed by several political ones. The concept of morphological 
freedom can no longer be reduced to an ideological notion. It demands diverse forms of policy 
actions: public deliberation, regulation, institutionalisation, or ban. Freeden claimed that one of the 
main characteristics of ideologies that distinguishes them from political philosophies is that 
ideologies always inspire political action. The same claim can be extrapolated to ideological 
concepts as well. In this regard, morphological freedom has an extraordinarily strong motivational 
power on politics. 
Liberty is decontested as morphological freedom in the transhumanist conceptual arrangement, 
but another concept emerges logically from this decontestation. Freedom entails self-
determination, which is further decoded as self-development combined with bodily self-
determination. However, it logically entails two additional rights-related concepts. One of them is 
the ‘freedom of experimentation’: applying technology without major constraints. It should be 
accorded to both private or state-funded institutions in which research and development are 
practiced with as few regulations as possible, restricted mostly by the ethics of science. But such 
liberty refers also to the individual, who ought to be free to apply these developments. Chan et al. 
(2011) have conveyed the concept of ‘scientific citizenship’ in their argument for patients’ 
participation in high-risk clinical research. Steve Fuller further developed this concept and 
demonstrated that morphological freedom can be defined as extended scientific citizenship, the 
practice of which creates lower costs (or losses) for society than socially approved activities such 
as extreme sports or playing the lottery (Fuller and Lipińska, 2014a). 
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One of the most controversial and heavily contested transhumanist peripheral concepts is 
procreative beneficence, which was put forward by Julian Savulescu to defend the transhumanist 
advocacy for germline modification. According to this idea, parents (or single reproducers) with 
full personhood and risk-evaluating capabilities should be accorded the right to ‘select the child, 
of the possible children they could have, who is expected to have the best life, or at least as good a 
life as the others, based on the relevant, available information’, employing genetic tests (Savulescu, 
2001). In practice, this means that parents are free to genetically screen their embryos and select 
freely the embryo which the parents think has the best chances for a good life. Others moved even 
further, demanding the freedom of the parent(s) to apply inheritable alterations (germline 
modification) to their children in order to enhance the offspring’s capabilities, provided they are 
entirely, or at least to the current state of scientific knowledge, aware of the risks and their 
consequences for the invasive procedure on their child. 
The core concept of welfare is presented in transhumanist ideology through two components: 
human enhancement and longevity. Welfare is defined as the fulfilled ‘desire for more life, more 
intelligence, more freedom’ (More, 1990a, p. 4). Human enhancement is the tool for humanity to 
transcend its biological limits, end the biological evolution based on random selection, and start a 
new era of technology- and science-driven directed evolution. The augmentation of cognitive, 
physical, and emotional capabilities will lead to a world with less or no pain and suffering, as the 
hedonistic principle of transhumanism promises (Pearce, 1995). The main reason that explains and 
justifies enhancement is that transhumanists view the human as a handicapped, faulty biological 
being, the unfinished project of nature (More and Vita-More, 2013, p. 449). James Hughes 













enhancement should be applied: curing disabilities, improving general health conditions, longevity, 
upgrading intelligence, exerting better emotional control, widening the opportunities for aesthetic 
expression, achieving spiritual goals, and ensuring better lives for our children (Hughes, 2010). 
However, transhumanists are divided and lack a consensual understanding of enhancement. 
Stefan Sorgner differentiated between strong and weak transhumanist approaches to enhancement 
(Sorgner, 2016, p. 144). Representatives of the strong version claim that it is a moral – though not 
legal – obligation of the individual to apply the available enhancement technologies, and it is the 
political task of governments and the legislature to allocate financial resources to scientific research 
aiming to develop such technologies. Advocates of weak transhumanism decline any moral or legal 
obligation concerning enhancement, even if it may lead to many people living a good life. They 
argue that such a moral duty cannot be established and, consequently, policy action cannot be 
articulated because any theoretical consensus about the concept of good life does not exist and 
seems impossible to reach. To resolve the debate, Sorgner suggested a radically pluralistic account, 
which promotes the individual’s pursuit of a good life according to their own idiosyncratic and 
diverse standards. Therefore, Sorgner pointed out the significance that transhumanists invite the 
peripheral concept of good life to cement the core concept of human enhancement in its central 
position while utilising a further adjacent concept, diversity. 
Persson and Savulescu suggested that moral enhancement is also inevitable if we want to 
protect the human species from itself. Inherently human behaviours – such as the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons, terrorist attacks, or anthropogenic climate change – jeopardise human existence 
(Persson and Savulescu, 2012, p. 660). Our current moral dispositions were designed for an archaic, 
primitive civilisation with rudimentary technologies, living in pastoral communities. Our natural, 
or ‘species-specific’, cognitive and psychological capabilities make us easily manipulable and in 
possession of conflicting moral dispositions. Consequently, we are unfit for the high-tech 
civilisation and the globalised world. Consequently, the concept of moral enhancement became an 
integral part of the broader concept of human enhancement.  
According to transhumanists, the most important aim of practicing one’s right to bodily self-
determination and the proactive approach to scientific and technological advances is to extend the 
healthy lifespan far beyond the current human-specific life expectancy. They started using the term 
‘longevity’ to describe this desire. Transhumanists prefer deriving longevity from the concept of 
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welfare by claiming that without the expansion of the healthy lifespan or, even more explicitly, 
without immortality, human welfare cannot be significantly improved. Death is the most salient 
limit to the realisation of human potential, which dwarfs poverty and wealth in comparison. 
Additionally, the death of our loved ones is the most terrifying source of emotional suffering that 
puts human psychological capabilities to the test. Within the transhumanist ideological structure, 
the concept of longevity serves as an effective tool designed for mass consumption and to 
popularise the transhumanist ideology. In addition to evoking the most archaic and fundamental 
human psychological trait – the fear of death and the lament over the finiteness of life – a welfarist 
argument was also put forward in favour of longevity through the introduction of the idea of the 
longevity dividend (Bailey, 2007; Sandberg, 2007; Olshansky, 2013), which encompasses the 
assumed economic benefits of extending the healthy lifespan indefinitely and reducing the health 
care costs associated with ageing. 
The concept of progress also has an eliminable role within transhumanism, which conceives 
of progress as a ‘boundless expansion’ (More, 1990b, p. 17), a perpetual and endless process. It 
adopts the theory of evolution and hypothesises that science and technology will enable humanity 
not only to take control over the fallible, nature-driven evolution, but also to accelerate its pace and 
define its direction. Humanity will be able to take control over evolution, and our obligation is to 
proactively pursue this endeavour (More, 1990c). Progress is not only a desirable process, but also 
is the open-ended goal of (political) action through which the end-state, the posthuman condition, 
ought to be reached as soon as possible. Progress is the meaning of life (More, 2011, p. 140). 
Transhumanists demand that all individuals should support and proactively act according to the 
cause of progress. Morphological freedom allows the individual to voluntarily apply enhancement 
technologies, and these individual endeavours accumulate, thus contributing to the progress of all 
humanity. The demand and advocacy for proactivity is reflected in the adoption of the 
proactionary principle in transhumanism (Fuller and Lipińska, 2014b). This principle proposes 
decision-making based on transparent risk evaluation and an objective cost–benefit analysis that 
considers not only the potential dangers, but also the opportunity costs of inaction. It supports 
minimal regulations on technological innovation and scientific research as well as the unrestricted 
practice of morphological freedom to experiment with one’s own body. Thus, it stands in close 
proximity to the peripheral concept of the freedom of experimentation. Also, the proactionary 
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principle reflects activist impulses at the core of transhumanism and suggests profound ways of 
surpassing the fringe status of the contemporary movement, especially from a political context. 
This activist impulse demonstrates another ideological property of transhumanism. 
The concept of the proactionary principle is attached to morphological freedom in the 
ideological arrangement and the two together logically imbue the concept of freedom of 
experimentation, which, then, develops further into the concept of human enhancement to create 
an explanatory framework for the latter (see Figure 2). What we see here is a well-structured, 
logical, and culturally coherent set-up, where the proximity of four core and adjacent concepts 
provide transhumanism with exceptionally strong conceptual cohesion. 
Figure 2. The decontestation of the concept ‘human enhancement’ 
 
Transhumanists propose a new rights framework, based on the philosophical concept of 
personhood. It moves far beyond the anthropocentric view of other belief systems. In this new 
framework, the subject of the legal system is not required to necessarily belong to the human 
species. Transhumanists suggest that sapience, sentience, and most importantly non-
anthropocentric personhood serve as the new standard of rights (More, 2013). If enhanced 
biological and synthetic life forms and their hybrids with various levels of sentience are possible, 
it can logically be inferred that the rights system must be expanded to such personhood-possessing 
forms of existence. In his seminal work, Hughes proposed a rights system based on the personhood 
model (Hughes, 2004). He distinguished property-level and citizen-level rights statuses based on 
the cognitive capabilities of the rights bearer. In the former group belong those life forms who 










the second, self-aware group is bestowed with two types of citizenship: disabled and full. Children, 
mentally constrained human adults, and great apes would possess disabled citizenship with a 
limited set of rights, such as the right to life and the right to assistance to achieve full self-
determination, while full citizenship would entitle its bearer to all the rights available in the current 
rights system, extended with the right to morphological freedom. But the rights-bearer of full 
citizenship can be any intelligent life form – be they carbon-based, synthetic, or their hybrids – that 
possesses mature personhood with the capacity to reason. 
The post-anthropocentric perspective does not only distinguish transhumanism from other 
ideologies, but also confronts it with them. The bioconservative perspective (Fukuyama, 2003; 
Habermas, 2003), from which all contemporary ideologies derive their respective 
conceptualisations of the ideal social order, is fundamental for their self-articulation. As a result, 
the idea to replace this perspective with a broader one is necessarily received with disapproval and 
hostility. Thus, post-anthropocentrism entails a previously unseen level of confrontation between 
ideologies, and in this conflict, transhumanism stands alone as the newcomer challenger to 
established ideologies. 
 
3.2. Adjacent Concepts 
 
Transhumanism utilises a great variety of adjacent concepts also present in other mature 
ideologies, but it creates peculiar ideational morphologies. In general, these adjacent concepts serve 
two fundamental goals. First, they provide unique decontestations of meaning that strengthen the 
particularity and distinctiveness of the transhumanist ideological core. Second, transhumanism 
borrows familiar concepts and decontestations from other ideologies to follow the intellectual 
enrichment and political expansion of the transhumanist movement, as well as addressing major 
criticism against transhumanist ideas and policy proposals. 
Rationality has an adjacent role in transhumanism. As mentioned before, it is decontested as 
‘informed wish’ or ‘informed consent’ and attached to the core concepts of morphological freedom, 
human enhancement, and personhood. The agent is free to exercise morphological freedom 
irrespective of the community’s reaction, any form of peer group pressure, or implications for the 
society as a whole, provided that the consequences of their action do not harm others. Rationality 
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is also at the centre of the transhumanist argument in favour of allocating an increasing role to 
artificial intelligence in policy decision-making. As current human intelligence is vulnerable to 
manipulation – one of the main causes of the contemporary phenomenon of democratic backsliding 
and the loss of public trust in political institutions – artificial intelligence provides the means to 
correct the abuse of this human fallibility. Technology is presented as a tool to support and expand 
the limited human capability for making rational decisions. In this role, the concept of rationality 
is attached to another adjacent concept in the transhumanist ideological structure: democracy. 
As critics of transhumanism often have accused transhumanists of neglecting contemporary 
social problems, transhumanism developed a new decontestation to enrich its welfare concept. 
Technological abundance, or as it was reconfigured later, sustainable abundance, produced by 
the future, robot-driven economy was added to the conceptual structure of transhumanism to fill 
an ideational gap and make the ideology more intelligible and consumable for wider audiences. 
The concept of abundance presents a unique morphology within the transhumanist ideology. In its 
early articulation it referred merely to the need for the redistribution of funds to secure infinite 
basic natural resources and create material wealth. Several decades later it morphed into an 
enriched concept that incorporated other ideas such as self-development (through education), 
access to adequate health care and information technologies. Then it borrowed a concept from the 
green ideology to stimulate the imaginary of new audiences who otherwise had concerns about the 
consequences of unrestricted and permanent technological development. When it reached its 
current format (Wood, 2019) attached to the peripheral concept of sustainability, its maturity and 
shift to adjacency entailed that it incorporate other core, adjacent, and peripheral concepts as its 
main components and took a new position within the transhumanist conceptual arrangement: it 
shifted slightly further from welfare and progress and relocated in proximity to the concept of 
equality. This morphology also enabled transhumanism to reframe and re-contextualise long-
existing policy proposals present in other mature ideologies – for example universal basic income 
or environmental protection – and put them into the service of the transhumanist ideology. 
Democracy is decontested as a radically extended version of deliberative democracy in almost 
all transhumanist morphologies of the concept. Again, technology has a crucial role in articulating 
the transhumanist version of democracy. Direct democracy, conceptualised as the uttermost 
egalitarian and participatory form of partaking in shaping policy and politics, should be practiced 
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through applying the latest digital technologies to extend knowledge and electoral participation and 
garner collective intelligence. Transhumanist theorists agree that the contemporary functioning of 
democracy is utterly flawed; it needs to be reformed to better serve societies. David Wood proposed 
a new political system predicated on a mixture of plebiscitary democracy and technology-driven, 
knowledge-based policy decision-making in which well-informed, engaged voters enabled by new 
technologies would participate in frequent referendums while elected and accountable politicians 
decide on complex policy issues and consult a group of technocrats (Wood, 2018, pp. 233–252). 
Wood coined the notion superdemocracy to present his understanding of this new social 
arrangement (Wood, 2019, p. 101), which would utilise transhumanist technologies, such as 
artificial intelligence, big data, computational science, and cognitive enhancement, to mend human 
fallibilities and vulnerabilities that stem from the lack of immunity from manipulation and the 
tendency for irrational behaviour immanent in human nature. These are supposed to enable the 
electorate to ameliorate executive accountability and to fact-check the validity and adequacy of 
political claims. This technophile vision of democracy, however, raises concerns of a totalitarian 
dystopia, of losing control and succumbing to ‘machine overlords’. To mitigate the totalitarian 
potential of transhumanist ideas, theorists of the left-leaning wing of the transhumanist movement, 
technoprogressives, adopted the idea of the need to democratise technology. For them, 
transhumanism is the democratisation of technology and the technologisation of democracy. Thus, 
democracy presented a unique morphology in which two components – participation and equality 
– have particular importance, and the concept itself was attached to the concept of abundance to 
become its essential component.  
The concept of equality is first associated with the equality of opportunity as a distinguishing 
component in the transhumanist conceptual arrangement. Then, it is further contextualised from 
the socio-economic perspective as the equality of opportunity to access enhancement technologies. 
A further peripheral concept emerges in transhumanism with regards to the equality issue and 
reveal the semantic aspects of ideology formation: accessibility. It is present in two distinguished 
manifestations. The first emphasises free access to enhancement technologies, while the other 
accentuates the access to free enhancement technologies. The order of the words reveals a deep 
ideological distinction that gave birth to the two main political branches within the transhumanist 
movement. The ‘free access’ branch stresses freedom and neglects the social equality aspects while 
the ‘access to free’ branch emphasises the need for a redistributive scheme to guarantee social 
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equality and prevent exclusion based on wealth. Hence, the adjacent concept of equality is further 
decontested in two distinct forms in the transhumanist conceptual arrangements. However, both 
equality interpretations are based on the precondition that the future socio-economic environment 
will secure technological abundance and scarcity will disappear from the economy. 
Figure 3. Transhumanist decontestation of the concept of equality 
 
Diversity occupies an important position within the conceptual structure of transhumanism. 
First, morphological freedom will allow a great variety of new technological tools for expressing 
individuality and uniqueness while contributing to the decrease of peer pressure, prejudices, and 
societal pressure endemic in contemporary communities (Sandberg, 2013, p. 59). Second, germline 
modification and controlled evolution will produce physically and cognitively more diverse 
humans as well as new living beings (Sorgner and Ranisch, 2015, p. 210; Hauskeller, 2016, p. 18). 
Third, the right to abstention is inherent to morphological freedom: those who choose to remain 
‘natural’ are not only free to do so, but also entitled to special protection. This situation will result 
in a greater variety of people living together. 
The position of the concept of state within the transhumanist ideational configuration has also 
undergone significant diachronic changes. Today its position clearly separates major political 
branches of transhumanism. Libertarian techno-optimists remain sceptical and suspicious of state 
intervention and regulations while democratic transhumanists (technoprogressives) allocate a key 
redistributive role to the state in their political and theoretical arguments. Technoprogressivism 
upgrades the concept of the state to adjacency together with the peripheral concept of redistribution. 
It envisions an activist state as the guarantor of equal and free access to enhancement technologies 
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3.3. Peripheral Concepts 
 
Today, transhumanism can be considered an ‘umbrella ideology’ under which advocates of 
distinctive policy agendas, issues, and subcultures gather and construct ideological subvariants of 
transhumanism. Consequently, the emergence of peripheral concepts is closely linked to this 
ideological variegation. Peripheral concepts are mostly borrowed from other established or less-
developed ideologies: reconciliation ecology from environmentalism (Rosenzweig, 2003, p. 1), 
blockchain-backed digital privacy from cryptoanarchism, and technological gender neutrality from 
feminism (Haraway, 1987, 1991) are prime examples of this ideational expansion. 
Their significance is manifold. First, they change the position and proportion of core and 
adjacent concepts within the transhumanist conceptual structure. The role of such relocation is to 
enable the transhumanist ideology to overcome existing cultural constraints or create new ones, as 
well as responding to logical constraints that emerge from moving closer to other concepts. For 
example, the appearance of the peripheral concepts of redistribution and accessibility allows the 
adjacent concept of equality to occupy a greater space and gain higher ranking within the 
conceptual arrangement proposed by technoprogressivist transhumanism. Second, they create new 
bonds with other concepts, and thus, they generate novel policy actions that otherwise the original 
concept would not necessarily entail. For example, the adjacent concept of abundance alone does 
not necessarily demand ecological considerations in policymaking. Finally, peripheral concepts 
spawn new ideological versions, as was shown above. These peripheral concepts greatly contribute 
to the ideological thickening of transhumanism, as it becomes capable of expanding to greater 
semantic fields and occupying symbolic territories to capture the public imaginary. 
 
3.4. An Ideological Map of Transhumanism 
 
During this morphological analysis, four core concepts and a number of adjacent concepts were 
revealed that mutually reinforce each other. These key concepts form the conceptual architect of 
transhumanism – a distinct arrangement to evince the solidifying ideational cluster of 
transhumanism. Figure 10 shows a possible conceptual map of the transhumanist ideology based 
on Freeden’s two-dimensional spatial map, in which the position of the concept reflects priority, 
proximity, and permeability. 
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Figure 4. The conceptual map of transhumanism 
 
3.5. The Thin-Centredness of Transhumanism 
 
The argument to define transhumanism as a thin-centred ideology is three-fold. First, its ability 
to distinguish itself from other ideologies through distinct core concepts and the post-
anthropocentric perspective is properly verified within the Freedenian theoretical framework. 
Second, despite the recent thickening, transhumanism still exhibits limited responsiveness due 
partly to its reduced capacity to respond to a broad range of policy areas without borrowing ideas 
and solutions from other, mature ideologies, and because it addresses only a specific (mostly 
technology- and science-related) group of political issues. Whenever transhumanists attempt to 
provide answers to policy issues unaffected by the techno-science revolution, they struggle to find 
or create original, decontested concepts typical of transhumanism. Finally, it is justified to assert 
that to a limited extent transhumanism can present effective conceptual decontestations; put 
differently, decontested explanations of the current reality of our world. Table 1 summarises the 
main ideological attributes of transhumanism and their manifestations and evaluates them with 
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respect to their presence, significance, and prevalence according to Freeden’s description of 
ideologies. It illustrates that some key attributes are missing or have restricted significance in 
transhumanism which buttresses the thin-centredness hypothesis.  
Table 1. Ideological maturity of transhumanism based on Freeden’s description. 
Attribute Manifestation Evaluation Example or comment 
Distinctiveness 
distinctive configuration of concepts yes presents a unique ideological core 




raising novel issues yes 
procreative freedom 
longevity 
proposing novel and distinct 
solutions to existing issues 
yes 
liquid democracy 
freedom of experimentation 
offering solutions to a wide range of 
policy issues 
no 
it needs to borrow concepts from other 
ideologies to fill the gaps 




Hughes’s 3D model of politics Fuller’s 
90-degree shift of politics 
Coherence 
diachronic and synchronic stability of 
the conceptual core 
yes 
the five core concepts have been 
present since the beginning of the 
transhumanist movement 
Adaptability yes 
the ability to internalise concepts or 




shared by significant groups no 
the current membership of the 
movement is estimated at 50k 
broad circulation restricted 
pop culture contributes to popularising 
transhumanist ideas 
inspiring policy action restricted 
some public discussion, but not 
mainstream 
control of language no 
it has so far been unable to modify the 
language of politics 
group product yes  
mobilisation potential restricted low membership 
Consumability 
Language yes simple, comprehensible language 
Visuality yes globally unified logo  
Emotions restricted it does not assign emotional 
importance to its key values, nor 
recognises it the centrality of emotion 
in socio-political interactions 
overt and coded messages no not yet developed such ambiguity to 
allow for various interpretations 
Creativity yes it is able to stimulate public imaginary 
Institutionali-
sation 
political representation restricted niche proto-parties 
Elections no very few candidates 
elected officials no only some rare and insignificant cases 






In the 21st century, thin-centred, immature ideologies are tools in the hands of those who 
initiate change in society and politics. Albeit utopias and thin-centred ideologies fundamentally 
differ, their role is similar: to contest dominant ideologies and dogma. Among the newcomers, 
transhumanism has great potential for ideological thickening as the process is supported by 
disruptive technological and scientific progress. 
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